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DEVISING PROCEDURES THAT ARE CIVIL TO
PROMOTE JUSTICE THAT IS CIVILIZEDt
Maurice Rosenberg*
!.

INTRODUCTION

procedure and process in this era is not likely to set
our blood to pounding. It seems a thin gruel to serve in times
like these when we have so many meat-and-potatoes evils to worry
about-so many flaming substantive issues to quench: air we can see
but not breathe; water we can smell but not drink; cities crumbling;
students rumbling; crime raging; wars waging; drug abuse expanding; and brotherhood contracting.
Yet, in my book, procedure is important. Hastily, may I say that
I am not by that comment inserting a sly plug for the casebook that
Arthur Miller foregoes using in his Civil Procedure course at
Michigan, or that Ben Kaplan eschews in his Civil Procedure offering at Harvard. 1
In a democracy, process is king to a very large extent, and this is
especially so in the judicial branch. Even though substantive laws
command attention, procedural rules ensure respect. Why is this
true? One powerful reason is that when people end up in court, their
case typically is not a matter of right against wrong, but of right
against right. Decent process makes the painful task of deciding
which party will prevail bearable and helps make the decision itself
acceptable.
To put my position plainly, I believe that the road to court-made
justice is paved with good procedures. Later on we shall have a look
at what I mean by "good." For now, it is enough to note that procedures cannot be "good" or "bad" in isolation, without relation to
their context. They must be viewed as part of an enlightened system
of judicial administration, criminal and noncriminal. They must fit
into a whole. The law may in some sense be a seamless web, but in
the administration of justice separations are necessary and must be
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recognized. Some lines must demarcate the spheres of courts and
some must demarcate the spheres of other agencies of justice, such
as legislatures, official boards, or even private entities. One of today's
problems is that the seams are not showing clearly enough. To devise
better court procedures, we must at some point determine what special role courts-in contrast to other agencies-can most usefully
play in delivering justice to the people. This definitional process will
help us know which quarrels and conflicts courts ought to countenance and which they should leave to other social instrumentalities.

II.

PROMOTING QUALITY JUSTICE-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Procedural rules have to be seen not only as performing their
particular functions, but also in the context of the judicial process as
a whole. In the round, they are one unit in the system designed to
promote quality justice through that process-an element in
the science of judicial administration. When we examine the state
of judicial administration in this country, we encounter the paradox
that the science is alive and well but the patient is failing. "Crisis"
is the word most commonly used to describe the status of our judicial
system.
Nonetheless, foreign judges and scholars throng here to study
our methods of judicial administration. Some might think these pilgrimages akin to visiting a morgue to learn health habits. But in my
opinion the visitors are right to make them. In this nation we have
invested more energy, attention, concern, and resources than has any
other place on earth in an effort to upgrade judicial administration.
That the investment has left us far short of perfection is an obvious
understatement and a fact that is no secret abroad. Then why do our
friends keep visiting?
My speculation is that the jurists who come here from France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and other nations, west and east, appreciate
our realism and devotion more than our achievements. While their
court problems differ in kind, their interest runs parallel to ours.
Like us, they need new information and methods to improve their
courts and are prepared to go outside the traditional domain of
lawyerly knowledge for help, as we are doing here.
Last May a contingent of Italian jurists made an extended visit
to judicial-administration centers in this country, equipped with a
comprehensive "Program of Study and Research" and with introductions arranged by our State Department. Their agenda disclosed a wide range of up-to-date interests. The visiting judges
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wanted to know what our specialists in court systems could tell them
about a sophisticated list of judicial-administration items. They
wanted to learn all they could about the adaptability of managementscience principles to courts; about cost-benefit analysis; about advanced data collection techniques, including the effective uses of
interviews and questionnaires; and about new types of hardware for
storing and processing data. They asked about new methods of making systematic studies of procedural rules in operation and about
many other sophisticated developments in judicial administration,
management, and evaluation.
The Italians' questions contrast interestingly with the program
proposed in July by an American Bar Association Task Force on
Standards of Judicial Administration (Task Force).2 After canvassing
several principles it regarded as accepted and correct, and after ticking off some notable failings in the administration of justice in federal and state courts, the Task Force reported:
The greatest need and opportunity for fresh effort in judicial
administration concerns the quality of justice itself. Standards and
techniques concerning court organization, procedure and management are not enough, for they do not deal directly with the quality
of justice as it reaches each individual citizen who becomes involved with the courts as a litigant, complainant, witness, juror or
public observer. In our opinion a major effort is required to improve the quality of the administration of justice and to establish
standards to advance this goal.3
It is clear enough that the Task Force effort is designed to go beyond
organization, procedure, and management for courts. How far beyond
ought it go, and into what areas?
The reference to "quality of justice as it reaches each individual
citizen" is not to be thought of as a call for standards that will assure
perfect, neverfail, hand-crafted justice in each and every case. The
Lorelei and Sirens are waiting to ·wreck the ships of reformers who set
their courses by the loveliest stars instead of by those that will bring
them to port. We shall be self-defeatingly quixotic if we try to devise
a system of Rolls Royce judicial treatment to deliver perfect justice
in each of millions upon millions of cases. We need the highest
quality we can possibly achieve in our system, our procedures, our
management methods and personnel, and in the judges who preside
in our courts. This focus on the apparatus of justice is not indicative
of lack of solicitude for each litigant as a singular and worthy person
2. ABA TASK
5. Id. at!!.

FORCE ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, REPORT

(1970).
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entitled to our deepest concern. On the contrary, it is concern for
the individual that compels a view of the conditions of justice in
breadth and depth.
We must never forget that it is a mass-phenomenon problem we
are at grips with-one immensely complex and stubborn. Part of the
reason we have had so much difficulty in gaining ground on it is our
eagerness to find once-for-all, perfect, and plain solutions. But
solutions that seem obvious also seem not to work. For example,
why not just add more judges? The answer, sad to say, is that creating new judgeships has not resulted in keeping the courts abreast
of their workload. Senator Joseph D. Tydings called attention to
this bleak truth when he pointed out that
[b]etween 1951 and 1966 we continued to add new judges to the
federal district courts, but the total backlog in those courts increased
by more than 15 percent.
. . . In recent years despite a 25 percent increase in judicial manpower, the federal courts were able to step up the disposition of
cases by only three percent.4
We can be confident that the Task Force is aware of these troublesome facts and will not take the simplistic "add-judges" approach to
improved standards. I hope the Task Force is also aware of other
fool's-gold of this sort, and goes at its work with determined, imaginative, and persistent devotion.
Past efforts to improve judicial administration by fell swoops and
bold strokes have uncovered some tried and true pitfalls. One of the
best ways to fail is to approach the problem as if the whole venture
consisted of finding a set of vaccines for a set of judicial ailments. A
good example of that approach is a pamphlet entitled Ten Cures for
Court Congestion, 5 a famous list of unsuccessful prescriptions concocted in the 1950's. Apodictic imperatives of that kind are losers.
They look good on the front cover of the brochures, but they do not
work. They have to be put to one side, along with various other
sure-cure panaceas and three-minute recipes for happy courts.
To the same limbo must be consigned the bagful of tinkerings
and patchings that includes split trials, interest from the day of
injury, inducements to waive jury trials, statements of readiness or
of super-readiness, and other gimmicks aimed especially at personalinjury litigation. When the Titanic is sinking, there is no use in
bailing water with thimbles.
4. Tydings, Modernizing Our Courts, 4

GEORGIA ST.

B.J. 84, 85-86 (1967).

5. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON COURT CONGESTION, TEN CURES FOR COURT CoNGESTlON

(1959).
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The first hope is to attain some perspective on our problems: the
glutted calendars and mobbed courtrooms; the unconscionable delays, alternating with rush-rush-rush; the mistreatment of jurors
and witnesses; the excessive expense; the tarnished image of justice
for millions of Americans. These are chiefly ills of big-city courtsNew York and Chicago being uninspiring examples. Other countries have big cities, too-Tokyo, London, Rome. Yet they seem not
to be afflicted as badly as we are in their efforts to deliver civilized
justice through courts. Why?
Comparative studies may be instructive. But the help we need
will not, in my opinion, come in the form of importing specific rules
or practices from the British or Italian systems. Rather, it will come
from the opportunity the comparisons give to hold up a mirror to
our own pluralistic system, free from the distorting effects of viewing
the too familiar from too close up. Thus, in these lectures, my colleagues will draw upon their experiences as eminent comparatists to
stimulate our capacity for self-appraisal. My focus, on the other hand,
will be upon insights, real or imagined, gained by empirical studies
in the "field," where one can systematically observe procedural
rules and practices in action ap.d attempt to gauge their impact.
In a world that is ever more oriented to empirical inquiry-facthappy, statistics-conscious, and science-minded-the law has joined
the procession belatedly. Yet join it has. Now, lawmakers commonly
hold hearings, call upon experts, study statistical tables and charts,
and so forth, before they enact new laws. They usually look before
they legislate.
Less popular has been the procedure of looking after they legislate. Until recently, it was very rare for a legislative body to employ
evaluation research or impact studies to find out whether the
injection of new law had made any difference. This oversight
is traceable to an odd conceit of the law that can be summed up in
terms familiar to every law student. The three commandments of
legal reform are
(1) Identify the "evil to be remedied."
(2) Pass a law to remedy it.
(3) Go on to the next evil.
Law reform has had a strong addiction to the motto of Satchel
Paige, the baseball pitcher and sage extraordinaire, who used to
advise: "Never look back. They might be gaining on you." That is
fine advice for aging ballplayers, but poor practice for lawmakers.
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Happily, the new look in law is intent on finding out how rules
function in fact and not only in thinking about how they ought to. 6

III.

PUTI'ING "QUALITY OF JUSTICE" IN

Focus

If we all agree that we want standards of quality in justice, how
shall we go about setting them? Is "quality justice" definable, or is it
like Justice Stewart's dictum about hard-core pornography-something I can't define, "But I know it when I see it ..."?7
Is quality justice like beauty-relative, and existing only in the
eyes of the beholders? If so, are the beholders all those whom we
encompass anonymously in our minds when we proclaim that justice
must not only be done but must be seen to be done? That would
encompass litigants, lawyers, jurors, witnesses, spectators, and the
larger public that becomes aware of the case and its course. To measure quality from that standpoint would require public-opinion and
attitude surveys about the law, courts, judges, lawyers, and the whole
judicial panoply. Surveys of that sort are interesting and instructive,
but, given the fleeting character of what is deemed to be good and
beautiful in the public fancy, one would not want to hitch the quality
of justice to the passing bandwagon of popular fad.
There must be intrinsic elements in justice of good quality. It is
these we must identify if we can, rather than depending upon public attitudes or opinions about the system and its parts.
Our system does contain recognized categories and clusters of
values that might be regarded as standards or criteria of quality
justice. Category A is the due process cluster-the constitutional imperatives that have evolved as guarantors of basic decency in our
civil-litigation process: fair notice, opportunity to be heard, and trial
by a tribunal that is both impartial and jurisdictionally related to
the litigants or their dispute. In addition, we might include in this
category the Supreme Court's doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor!:
"Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation."9
Category B is made up of values that are not elements of ordered
liberty in the due process sense, but nonetheless are basic and traditional. One basic value is that litigants shall have easy access to courts.
Reflecting the strength of this value are several related practices: filing costs are low, legal fees are often contingent, and the loser need
6.
7.
8.
9.

Rosenberg, The New Looks in Law, 52 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 539 (1969).
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) Oustice Stewart, concurring).
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
329 U.S. at 507.
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not reimburse the winner for his litigation expenses. Other basic
policies are implicit in the principles favoring an opportunity for
vigorous cross-examination of adverse witnesses and insisting that
the first-round loser shall have a chance at review by a collegial
court. Still another policy reflecting basic values in this category is
the heavy stress on the desirability of deciding cases on their merits
rather than upon procedural missteps.
Category C encompasses the human equation: judges and lawyers
of probity, capacity, and merit. The Task Force will surely be
interested in these human factors in quality justice, for the American Bar Association has long urged selection of judges on merit and
has recently produced a new Code of Professional Responsibility10
that gives hope of improving the breed of lawyers in the place where
it counts most-the realm of their professional conduct.
Category D consists of those subtle factors or elements the presence or absence of which in various degrees might affect our confidence that a fair tribunal would reach a correct decision. They are
relevant for assessing whether some trials are "better" or "worse"
than others; not on the score of due process or the traditional values
(all of which are hypothesized to be present in both groups), but with
regard to characteristics soon to be suggested.
Category E consists of energy-conserving criteria that do not
enter directly into the adjudication; they concern efficiency.
Where is improvement in quality likely to be made? Quite
clearly, the due process standards that appear in Category A are beyond both the Task Force's power and desire to change. Rather, a
Standards Commission will probably affirm in the strongest terms its
devotion to the short list of constitutional and Supreme Court commands.
As to the basic and traditional aspects of common-law litigation
embraced in Category B, again the strong likelihood is that no one
will urge that any be dropped or curtailed. Easy access to courts, low
costs, cross-examination, and the other practices in group B are not,
as I see it, in danger of extinction in the name of improving quality.
Category C-the human equation-is a logical area in which to
attempt to improve the quality of justice. The Task Force will undoubtedly look closely at the personal element in the judicial system, since high quality judges are a sine qua non of high quality
justice.11 In terms other than quantitative the human factors are
IO. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILlTY AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETmcs (1970).
11. Rosenberg, Frank Talk on Improving the Administration of Justice, 47 TEXAS
L. REv. 1029, 1031 (1969).
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most difficult to evaluate in isolation. Rather than analyzing them
separately at this point,12 we can, in my opinion, gain some insights
into these human traits by looking at the elements in Categories D
and E-those that relate to "trial quality" and functional efficiency.
Most of what is proposed here concerning these elements is the
residue of my experience with the Columbia Project for Effective
Justice (Project) 13 in the eight-year period beginning with the
Project's inception in 1956. There is no need to douse you with
a barrelful of detailed statistics about the field studies the Project made on the operation of procedural rules and practices. Any
references to particulars in the comments that follow will serve only
to raise general questions and develop a few working hypotheses.
These hypotheses will then become the take-off point for entering
into a discussion of how the administration of justice might be
improved by devising better processes, broadly defined.
In the first place, a number of these reflections on "quality of
justice" rest upon a tiresome amount of hand-to-hand wrestling with
the definition of that phrase in New Jersey. The wrestling was done
in connection with an official controlled experiment to determine
the effectiveness of compulsory pretrial conferences in negligence
cases. 14 The genesis of the experiment can be recounted briefly.
In 1948, New Jersey, under the judicial leadership of Arthur T.
Vanderbilt and his distinguished lieutenant William J. Brennan, Jr.,
broke new ground by making pretrial conferences mandatory in all
civil actions.15 Their overriding purpose was, in Justice Brennan's
words, "to further the disposition of the cases according to right and
justice on the merits." 16
In the classic New Jersey form, the dynamics of pretrial conferences are quite simple. When a case is well along the path to trial, the
judge calls the lawyers to a private meeting at which he works with
them to sharpen and condense the issues and mold the case in a way
that will help improve its presentation at trial. Some judges maintain
that the procedure is also useful in encouraging pretrial settlements,
but for the rule makers the primary purpose was improved quality
rather than greater efficiency.
In 1959, the trial bar of the state had mounted a vigorous cam12. See text accompanying notes 37-43 infra.
13. See M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964).
14. See id.
15. See Brennan, Pre-Trial Procedure in New Jersey-A Demonstration, 28 N.Y. ST.
B. Buu.. 442 (1956).
16. Id. at 449.
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paign to abolish pretrial conferences in accident cases on the ground
that they accomplished nothing and wasted time. Chief Justice Joseph
Weintraub, Vanderbilt's successor, asked the Project to study the
mandatory pretrial conference system in negligence cases and to
report its :findings. Since his court had the power to make and revise
rules, we were able to persuade it to install an official controlled
experiment. The major objective was to learn whether the mandatory
conference improved the quality of justice in cases subject to it. We
also were interested to learn whether the procedure substantially reduced the courts' time outlay in disposing of personal-injury suits.
To install the experiment, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
suspended the mandatory pretrial rule for a six-month period in
seven test counties. Instead of compelling a pretrial conference in
every case, the court required one in every second case, chosen at
random. In scientific parlance, the former group of cases then served
as a control group and the nonmandatory cases as an experimental
group.
A total of 3,000 cases went through the experimental program in
1960. We waited two years until they had run their full courses to
either settlement or trial and beyond. By obtaining answers to detailed questionnaires from the judges, lawyers, and clerks involved
in the cases, careful reports were amassed on important variables.
The data were then coded, compiled, and analyzed. Three major
sets of findings emerged, two of which can be disposed of with brief
mention. In the first place, the mandatory pretrial conference procedure produced a loss in judge time, not a saving, so that it could
not be justified as an efficiency-promoting device. Second, to our
surprise, it developed that the mandatory pretrial system had the
effect of increasing the size of the plaintiffs' recoveries. This result,
no one had expected. Influenced by the rather dramatic evidence that
the mandatory pretrial conference was not an efficient procedure as
conducted by their judges-who spent about twenty per cent of their
pretrial time on it with no saving in trial time-the New Jersey
supreme court in 1964 made pretrial optional instead of obligatory
in the largest class of civil cases.17
The issue that concerns us primarily, however, is not efficiency
but whether the mandatory procedure improved the quality of
justice. The literature is virtually silent on how this question is to
be answered systematically, probably because before the improvement of research methodology lawyers had no occasion to think about
17. N.J.R. Civ. PRAc. 4.29-l(a) (1969), as amended, N.J.R. CIV. PRAC. 4.25-2(a)
(1969).
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or attempt to state quality criteria in any serious or systematic fashion.
Justice Cardozo did not even advert to the subject in The Nature
of the Judicial Process. 18 Intuition and speculation were thought to
be all that one needed to discern how well the judicial system was
functioning, if one even deemed it necessary to go outside the system's
own quality control mechanisms of corrective motions and appealsthe built-in procedures for correcting errors in the litigation process.
The Project turned to these ready-made yardsticks to learn how
well the trial results stood up under formal attack launched by a
motion for a new trial or by appeal. We compared the control group
with the experimental group. Without going into great detail, I must
tell you that the effort was totally unrewarding. You can doubtless
guess why. Of the 3,000 cases, only twenty-seven were appealed,
twelve from the experimental group and :fifteen from the control
group. These :figures were too skimpy for statistical dependability.
And it would have been completely out of the question to pay serious
attention to the comparative number of successful appeals in the two
groups as a test of underlying quality of trial results because there
were fewer than a handful of reversals. A similar problem of scarcity
impaired the usefulness of the data on motions for new trials.
Therefore, we had to abandon the system's built-in quality yardsticks. We set out to construct new indicia that might be more useful
in measuring the influence of pretrial on the quality of the trials.
We turned to a set of factors we thought woud tell us in a
significant way whether the obligatory conference was making any
difference by focusing on a simple question: Was it producing better
trials?19 "Better" in the sense we used it did not refer to the
decisions reached, but to the process. Was the contest good, fair, and
informed? Was the case well and truly presented?
To evaluate the trials, we asked the clerks, judges, and lawyers to
· rate them along the following lines. Were the issues drawn clearly
and sharply? Was each lawyer well-prepared? Did the contending
parties' opposing versions of the facts emerge plainly before the jury?
Were there puzzling gaps or distracting redundancies in the evidence? Did either attorney appear to the judge or his adversary to be
a victim of tactical surprise? Were unexpected witnesses called, or
unanticipated documents produced? Was there the full mutual
knowledge of the relevant evidence that was extolled as essential to
proper litigation in the Hickman case?
18. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
19. M. RosENBERG, supra note 13, at 31-32.
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We also sent teams of observers to court to record independently
their observations of the judges at work in the pretrial conferences.
After analyzing the data from the more than 100,000 pages of records
that resulted, we were able to report perceptible evidence that the
cases subjected to mandatory pretrial conferences resulted in trials
that registered higher scores judged by our indicators of quality.
We did not put this finding as a firmly established fact-the data
were not clear enough for that-but rather as a well-based hypothesis that further research would be likely to confirm.
Fairly appraised, the New Jersey experiment did not score an
immediate major triumph, either methodologically or substantively.
It did not produce a procedural Salk vaccine, did not isolate the
virus of delay, or unlock the mystery of judicial ineffectiveness at
pretrial. Its most dramatic finding was negative: New Jersey's mandatory, universal pretrials did not step up judicial efficiency in
negligence cases. All that effort seems an expensive way of finding
out that the oyster has no pearl. But if you will take a longer view
of procedural field studies of this kind, and if you will permit a
change in the metaphor, you will see some doughnut around the hole.
For one thing, these studies permit us to say with more assurance
that pretrial and other highly touted court cures and nostrums simply
do not improve efficiency. Finding this out is valuable because it
cuts down traffic on the primrose path. That again may seem a perverse kind of progress until you consider what my colleague, Harry
W. Jones, has pointed out:
Physicists and biochemists often
fully as much from experiments
as from experiments that verify
law's experiments in the control

say that scientific knowledge gains
that invalidate research hypotheses
them. Perhaps the same is true of
of social behavior.20

Those who hope to improve court procedures by sustained 1:;fforts
must face the prospect that many of their favorite hypotheses will be
disproved by careful studies in the field. However, from the ashes of
these seeming failures better hypotheses and more useful insights
will undoubtedly arise.
I leave to my colleagues to say whether the criteria of quality by
which they would measure effectiveness in the English and Italian
civil-justice systems have anything in common with those mentioned
here. Obviously, to the extent that their systems' basic values diverge
from ours, the aims of good process may also part company. But
whether their indicia would be similar or different, the proposition
20, H.

JONES,

THE EFFICACY

OF

LAW 13 (1968).
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that to evaluate the quality of justice one must state the desired
indicia of performance seems to me as applicable to cross-cultural
procedural research as to the science or pseudo-science of intensive
empirical research in the field.
IV.

PROMOTING QUALITY JUSTICE: THINKING NEW THOUGHTS

The problem of promoting quality justice calls upon us for more
imaginative responses than continuing to do the same things we have
done for generations and merely adding deftness and efficiency. New
thoughts are in order, some of which will be unthinkable, or at least
unutterable, as I shall probably now demonstrate.
The more charitable among you may regard the proposals that
follow as "thinking aloud." Others will take them to be "more aloud
than thinking"; and the rest will just shrug them off as a gabble of
pipe dreams. Exposing you to these underdone ideas has two aims.
One is to show that although it is not hard to find faults with our
civil-justice system, it is very hard to find solutions. The other is to
invite you to join me in a group grope toward some possible new
approaches to our society's duty to deliver a civilized brand of civil
justice.
Like others today, the custodians of the administration
of justice have a problem of priorities. They must reallocate to
courts the disputes that courts are best suited for and that
are, in a sense, best suited for them. They also face the problem
of deciding whether the rewards and motivations now being
offered to key actors in the judicial system are sensible and effective.
Finally, they have problems of communication, both with regard to
the citizenry and with regard to those who perform functions within
the system.
A.

Reallocation of Disputes to Nonjudicial Disposition

A comprehensive reinvestigation of the question which human
disputes belong in the courts and which ones do not is long overdue.
One reason for this undertaking is practical necessity. Our courts
are simply and plainly being engulfed by a tidal wave of litigation,
criminal and civil. The steep upward climb in the incidence of crime
and the heavier per case demands resulting from newly defined procedural safeguards in criminal cases are major factors in this engulfment. The engulfment, in turn, may result in a feedback that actually
augments the rise in crime. Judge Carl McGowan, among others,
has pointed ou~
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... I have never believed that the volume of crime is significantly
responsive to what the courts do doctrinally, but I have come to
think that crime rises as the time increases from initial arrest to
final disposition; and delay is currently the greatest weakness in the
administration of criminal justice.21
This hypothesis holds deep significance for the administration of
civil justice. It warns that along with fairness, impartiality, and openness, celerity is a fourth dimension of quality criminal justice.
For reasons of humaneness as well as efficacy, criminal prosecutions must enjoy an absolute priority. As long as accused persons
are penned up in jails and some are clamoring for the speedy trials
that the Constitution guarantees them, we are unswervingly obligated to take drastic measures. We must engineer a massive expansion of our court systems; or arrange for the release of those detained
too long without a trial; or else bring about the decriminalization
of some categories of behavior now subject to penal law.
What is perfectly clear is that we cannot and must not use our
court facilities to deal with civil lawsuits if the consequence is to
force persons criminally accused to languish behind bars awaiting
trial. It is in this sense that criminal cases must be accorded absolute
priority. An instance of this priority treatment has already occurred
in New York City where last year the state courts ordered a temporary cessation of the trials of civil cases to permit the judges to devote
their time and energy to criminal trials. 22 We shall undoubtedly be
seeing more of this necessary expedient if the crisis in criminal justice
continues.
Criminal cases have no place other than the courts to go so long
as the offending conduct is defined as criminal. Of course, our
definitions of criminal conduct could be changed. Various offenses
against sumptuary, social, and sex behavior norms-drinking, drugging, gambling, prostituting, and so forth-could go the way of
minor offenses and simply exit from the courts. They could instead
be heard, with appropriate procedural safeguards, by public officials
other than judges in surroundings other than courtrooms.
However, there is also a civil side to the problem of court suffocation. Our system has long encouraged going to court and this
has been a healthy tradition. Now we have to face the fact that the
past quarter of a century has seen a quantum leap in the use of the
judicial process to remedy civil injustices. We clearly shall have to
21. C. McGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL
(1967).
22. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
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put up unfamiliar barriers to discourage or restrict litigating if we
are to avoid a complete breakdown in the justice system.
The signs are multiplying that some classes of civil disputes
will have to be excluded from the courts, entirely or in major
proportions. Leading the candidates for exclusion are the highvolume auto injury cases. Condemnation, probate, and ordinary
divorce matters are other logical contenders for out-of-court treatment.
However, the problem of the courts goes beyond quantitative
difficulties. Apart from coping with the volume, a compelling reason
for looking closely at the nature of controversies the courts hear
is to assure continued confi~ence in our judicial system. I refer here
to qualitative problems that, in my opinion, have two dimensions.
One is the danger of politicizing the courts; the other, of
augmenting social instability through excessive use of the judicial
process. United States Court of Appeals Judges Carl McGowan and
Shirley M. Hufstedler23 have recently addressed this subject and have
placed me greatly in their debt for some of the discussion that
follows.
Policy issues of high consequence and high tension have always
come before American courts and always will. The growing menace
today is the unrestrained tendency to take into the courts the most
explosive issues in the society-and to present them with explosive
forms of advocacy. There is a reason for this boom in resort to the
judicial process. Courts have been, no doubt about it, the most responsive and the most effective agencies of change during the past
generation. As a result, highly charged political and social issues,
among many others, increasingly have been brought to the courts,
not as a last resort, but as a first resort. The common attitude is that
courts can do anything-and will-and that a rule one does not care
for is not law unless a court says so-and the United States Supreme
Court at that.
For example, a short while ago the Columbia Spectator urged that
recently announced tax-related guidelines for campus political activity "have no legal status" because the Internal Revenue Service's
rulings and the "laws behind them can only be tested in court, and
such a test has never been made."24 (Of course, this argument should
not lead you to believe that if the courts happen to sustain the guide23. C. McGOWAN, supra note 21, at 75-82; Hufstedler, Dissent on Trial, 43 Omo BAR
1086 (1970).
24. Columbia Spectator, Oct. 1, 1970, at 2, col. 1.
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lines, tranquil acceptance of them will erupt on Morning-side Heights;
the Spectator was careful to add that "even if the courts were to
uphold ... the guidelines, the laws backing them can be replaced,
evaded or broken."25)
The editorial bring-s to mind the waggish thumbnail "Restatement of the Total Law" of three countries. In England, everything
is permitted that is not expressly forbidden. In Russia, everything is
forbidden that is not expressly permitted. And in France (and the
Spectator's editorial office), it makes no difference whether something
is permitted or forbidden; you do what you feel like.
One of the consequences of overworking the idea that there
is no law except as courts declare it is an erosion of confidence
in other branches of government and, to a large extent, in the lawmaking process of the society. Let me quote Judge McGowan again:
... the seeming miracles being wrought in the courts on behalf of
the disadvantaged are, in turn, stimulating new and ingenious assertions of legal right and injury by those of a more exalted economic status. Government at all levels finds its policies and actions
increasingly challenged from every side by appeals for judicial intervention.
There are searching questions to be asked as to whether this
development is wholly healthy, at least to the extent that it reflects
cynicism about the responsiveness of legislative or executive policy
to the political processes. It may be easier to file a lawsuit than to
run for office, but it is not necessarily a better way to run the country. The judicial pendulum swings, and mine is a generation before
whom our law professors incessantly paraded the then mischiefs of
government by judiciary.20

For Judge McGowan, there is reason to heed Justice Stone's admonition that "[c]ourts are not the only agency of government that must
be assumed to have capacity to govern."27
It would be bad enough if the sole result of all this resorting
to the courts were to undermine confidence in the representative
branches of government in favor of the judicial branch. But paradoxically the courts themselves suffer an erosion in popular respect as
they now begin to wield great powers in arenas they once declined to
enter. Many judges of compassion and broad outlook recognize that
if they sail into the eye of every social hurricane they will serve not
only as lighthouses for the hopeful, but also as lightning rods for the
frustrated.
25. Id.

26. C. McGowAN, supra note 21, at 104.
27. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 87 (1936) O'ustice Stone, dissenting).
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If irate losers cannot vent their disappointment in their votes for
legislators, they will turn upon the judges and the courts whenever
they get the chance. Thus, the judge who decided that cross-busing
was constitutionally necessary to achieve racially balanced schools
recently was turned out of office in Los Angeles when he stood for
re-election. 28 Think of what would happen at the polls in large
sections of the country if the judges who decided close questions in
church-state relations were forced to stand for election. As questions
that judges once defined as political are increasingly redefined by
them as judicial, the popular reaction will be to redefine the judge's
role as political, with unhappy consequences.
Perhaps the social forces at large in this country today have made
inevitable the weakening of doctrines that Judge Hufstedler has
referred to as the "litigation avoiders and stoppers."29 Among these ,
are the concepts of justiciability, standing, immunity, and abstention.
These doctrines no longer inhibit the courts from proceeding to
decision with the braking power they once exerted. The result has
been the greater politicization of the judicial process and an
"increase by several atmospheres of the pressure on the courts,"30 with
greater pressures still to come. Wrongly or rightly, the voters regard
the courts with less confidence if they think that the courts are making political decisions they ought not to be making.
Erosion of confidence is proceeding for still another reason: the
tendency toward constitutional overkill. Many lawyers regard every
case as a challenge to their ability to concoct a constitutional issue,
however far they must reach for it. It is not, in my opinion, a good
thing to tell the people of the country that the Constitution and the
Supreme Court will set right every dissatisfaction they have with the
way things are going. I am afraid that constant stretching and pulling
at the words of the Constitution to bring about good changes has
given some people the idea that contracting and pushing at its words
is a good way to bring about bad changes.
A group of upright and outraged citizens in Boston has lately
begun a suit to restrain CBS from showing the television program
Wild, Wild West because of its asserted overuse of violence and
horror. My personal sympathies are with the citizens. Does the
Constitution have anything more than the free speech principle to
help settle the dispute? According to press quotes of the plaintiffs'
filed papers, they want to close down the Wild, Wild West by getting
28. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1970, at I, col. 5.
29. Hufstedler, supra note 23, at 1088.
30. Id. at 1088.
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a judgment declaring that " 'child viewers of television programs
containing violence and horror are being deprived of their constitutional right to be free from mental harm caused by such programs
without due process of law.' " 31 Does that stretch the constitutional
argument a bit thin? Never mind. What's the Constitution for, if you
can't use it when you have a cause you care about deeply?
Try to explain that the use of constitutional categories may impose excessive rigidity in dealing with many issues that require
flexibility. Try to point out that the Constitution cannot be used
promiscuously without paying the usual penalty for promiscuity in
loss of reputation. I have nothing to recommend about the constitutional-overkill tendency beyond noting the danger. It merely underlines the point that we lawyers have been too intent on using the
adversary litigation model as the universal process for resolving disputes. This is explainable as advocates' conceit, but it has led us
to neglect other and better alternatives.
One alternative to taking every controversy imaginable to court
is to submit selected classes of civil controversies to tribunals other
than courts. Arbitration of labor disputes and commercial disputes
on an agreed and voluntary basis is an obvious model. Compulsory
arbitration of sued claims of 3,000 dollars or less has recently been
introduced in New York32 after many years of tryout in Pennsylvania.33 Both states give litigants the option of returning to the
courts if dissatisfied with the arbitration, but that option could be
annulled by appropriate measures. This process may find more
widespread acceptance; yet in long-range terms, it is not very satisfying to substitute one adversarial model for another.
A more hopeful approach would be to de-escalate the combative
character of large volumes of conflict-prone occurrences by providing
for "compensation without litigation." Examples would include the
statutes that authorize administrative boards to indemnify victims of
violent crimes; 34 and the slowly spreading programs of "no-fault"
automobile injury reparation. 35 And much more drastic departures
from the adversary model are conceivable. For example, why not
create a Department of Economic Justice to dispense quickly remedies in cash or in kind to complaining customers who have been
31. N.Y. Times, Nov. I!l, 1970, at 75, col. 1.
32. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
33. PA. STAT. tit. 5, § 30 (1963).
34. E.g., CAL. WELF. &: INSTNs. CODE § 11211 (West 1966); N.Y. Ex.Ee. LAW §§ 62035 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
35. E.g., MAss• .ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1970).
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unable to get satisfaction from the merchant or manufacturer responsible for the defective product?
Today, in our bondage to the adversary litigation process, we
operate with costly clumsiness. When a person is on welfare and his
seventy-five-dollar television tube has prematurely failed and we
want to express our concern for his rights and assure him that they
will be vindicated, we proceed from rigid habit. We refer him to a
lawyer in a neighborhood office who invests many hours of work in
investigating, telephoning, corresponding, and, perhaps, litigating
against an adversary whose lawyers do likewise, and, being
much better paid, doubtless invest even more adversarial energy.
The lawyers and litigants sometimes wind up in court where
they then consume judicial energies bought with public money. In
the end, it must often happen that the claim and litigation costs far,
far exceed the amount in dispute.
Why not try a totally different model? On a pilot project basis, I
propose that in a number of cities public funds or private financing
be obtained to undenvrite experimentally a system of delivering justice that would not start with combat and high friction costs. Its
main features would be simple. When the customer presents his
grievance, his statement will be taken down, he will sign his name,
and on the spot will be given the relief due him, up to a limit of,
say, 200 dollars or so, in cash or in kind.
From the public viewpoint, the system could have advantages not
only of economy but also of effectiveness. Through a national network of offices, the Department of Economic Justice would learn
quickly if a manufacturer has been making defective television tubes
or components on a grand scale; or thousands of unsafe brake linings;
or too many permeable raincoats. Then it would be able to take the
legal action appropriate to the situation-including wholesale (and
hence, economically worthwhile) suits to recover amounts it had
already paid out administratively, along with costs, interest, and
other economic sanctions; or cease and desist orders; or sterner sanctions if appropriate. This system would offer an efficient way of
coordinating complaints and consolidating claims that have a common basis. It would also permit quality control of a more effective
kind than isolated court suits do.
Similar procedures could also be applied against major merchandising enterprises, such as mail-order houses, national chain stores,
or large department stores. Wholesale bad practices could be
more readily exposed and eliminated, instead of, as is now true, being
lost to sight through diffusion.
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The consumer will realize these benefits: an instant remedy instead of the long drawn-out litigation process we now offer; clear
proof that society is concerned that he be dealt with fairly, which is
the fundamental message we want to convey; and the feeling that
society trusts him, since it takes his word that his claim is valid.
Some will say that the plan is naive and that consumers will cheat
on a massive scale by presenting dishonest claims. An antidote might
be to use the type of spot checks that income tax collection services
use-apparently with good results. The complaining consumer will
be told: "We trust you and will pay you, or repair or replace your
defective product. To guard against cheating by those who might
put in false claims, we will run random spot checks on applicants,
investigating some claims intensively. If the follow-up uncovers fraud,
we will deal with the culprit accordingly."
An experimental program could be set up and tried out in a
half-dozen cities with a ceiling for each claim of, for instance, 100,
200, or 250 dollars, and with a floor of twenty-five dollars. If the plan
worked well or could be modified to work well, it could be extended
to nonconsumer cases and to nonwelfare customers. As a matter of
fact, the experiment itself could make room for testing those types
and other types of cases in which economic justice could be delivered
sans litigation, sans lawyers, sans courts, sans everything-except a
prompt remedy and effective enforcement. If successful, the program
would warrant public funding out of appropriately gathered
revenues.
A principle of the type underlying the Department of Economic
Justice proposal was put forward in a different way recently by Judge
Macklin Fleming of California. He argued for what he termed
"routinization" of the handling of stereotyped disputes as a defense
for the litigation explosion:
Courts, executives, and legislatures can pool their efforts to encourage the development of institutions and techniques capable of
handling routine business in an inexpensive and expeditious way
outside the arena of adversary litigation.36
Judge Fleming had in mind divorce and decedents' estates matters,
both of which seem well-suited to other than lawsuit disposition
unless special circumstances arise. Other classes of conflict-prone
matters that should be shunted from the courts can readily be conceived.
l!6. Fleming, Court Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54
(1970).
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Of course, neither the hypothesized Department of Economic Justice, nor administrative agencies, nor arbitration boards, nor any
other official substitute for court-made dispositions, will be troublefree. Still, the effort to de-adversarialize and de-judicialize matters
that do not absolutely require the full panoply of court processes
must be made, problems or no.
The sum of all these proposals can be put bluntly. We lawyers
must rid ourselves of the habit of mind that holds that in conflict
management, happiness is a thing called "certiorari granted" or
"probable jurisdiction noted." We have to reconcile ourselvesindeed, we have to dedicate ourselves-to the proposition that courts
cannot do everything to correct society's flaws. We have to withdraw
from the judicial process some of the disputes that now threaten the
administration of justice-quantitatively, qualitatively, and explosively.
B.

Changing Rewards and Motivations

The problem of court delay has resisted man's valiant attempts
to conquer it as far back as one would care to look. It does not
appear to be as complicated a problem as many that human ingenuity
has solved over the ages. There must be more to the delay problem
than pathological obstinacy of a logical kind. What can it be?
One hypothesis is that we have built into the system incidental
and unintended rewards and motivations that induce the main
actors, who could stamp out most delay if they so desired, to decline
to do so. They are not necessarily acting irresponsibly or unprofessionally in withholding their cooperation. It has been pointed out
that "[p]art of the difficulty in getting rid of court congestion appears
to be ... [that] it is not simply an accidental defect of the law, but is
rooted in some of the legal system's most cherished characteristics." 37
Whether sought after or unbidden, wayward incentives manage to
find their way into the court processes and induce actions directly
opposed to the goals and objectives the system is designed to achieve.
Unforeseen self-interest is often the operative determinant. A piquant
example of this type of incentive emerged from the New Jersey pretrial conference experiment. In cases not scheduled for mandatory
pretrial, either lawyer was allowed to opt for a conference. Aside from
impairing the scientific purity of the experiment, this option developed an odd little datum-if you recall that a side effect of mandatory pretrial is to increase the plaintiffs' recoveries by substantial
37. Sykes, Cases, Courts and Congestion, in LAW
(L. Nader ed. 1969).

IN

CULTURE AND SoCIErY !127, !128

April 1971]

Devising Civil Procedures

817

amounts. In the first few hundred cases in which the option was
exercised by only one side, it was the defendants' attorneys who opted
seven times out of ten. We puzzled over why this should be, because
we could not see any particular advantage to defendants (insurance
companies) in having a pretrial conference in most cases. Then our
attention was drawn to an item in the New Jersey Bar Journal presenting the script of a fictitious one-act play. Its plot showed that an
eminent law firm, seemingly representing liability insurers, liked
pretrial conferences because it was paid on a piece-work basis for
each one attended and the price was rightl 38
A careful study of the system of judicial administration in each
of the states will reveal, I am confident, hidden incentives that
induce actions directly opposed to improved judicial effectiveness.
To find the hidden motivators will take skill, patience, and imagination. But the task is well worth the effort. If we once come to understand why la'wyers at times act perversely and contrary to the best
interests of the administration of justice, we can try to revise the
incentives and rewards so they will help advance, rather than oppose,
the judicial system's aspirations.
C.

Improving Communications

Changing incentives will not be enough, however, unless we
find effective ways to communicate the law's messages to its-for want
of a better word--customers. Communications science has been one
of the most neglected of society's resources in past efforts to improve
the administration of justice.
An example of this communications gap came to my attention in
the mid-1950's. In New York it had been noticed that about sixteen
per cent of all suits brought against persons covered by automobile
liability insurance were started without any advance claim, phone
call, letter, or warning. The plaintiff's lawyer simply served a
summons upon the insured, who forwarded the summons to his insurance company, which thus learned that a claim was pending
against its insured. Investigation disclosed that the plaintiff's bar
followed the "summons-first-notice" practice because by thus starting
suit the lawyer was protected against his claimant's change of heart
or change of lawyer. The filing of the suit gave the plaintiff's lawyer a
statutory lien on any recovery thereafter realized by the plaintiff,
even though he defected to another lawyer.
38. A Pretrial Conference, 3 N.J. ST. B.J. 363 (1960).
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To remedy this situation and to avoid promiscuous suing by the
plaintiff's bar, motivated in the way just described, the legislature amended the statute to provide that a lien would exist in
favor of the plaintiff's lawyer even if he did not start suit but merely
·wrote a claim letter. Records over the next few years showed that
the percentage of "summons-first-notice" suits started did not decline
to any appreciable extent. In 1959, at a meeting of the Plaintiffs
Trial Lawyers Association, I distributed questionnaires to a chamber
full of Association members, reported the statistics, and asked why
they continued using the "summons-first-notice" practice in view of
the statutory change that had been made in order to safeguard their
retainer liens by writing instead of suing. To my question the overwhelming response was, "What change in what law?"
The message had not gotten through. The change in motivation
had, therefore, not taken effect. The evil sought to be avoided accordingly persisted.
The point is that "good" procedures cannot work effectively, and
cannot, therefore, be good unless they are communicated to those
who are supposed to be made aware of them. In this country perhaps
our most notorious communications failure involves the jury, both
in criminal and in civil cases. We rhapsodize about the jurors as the
shields of our liberty, yet we treat them like imbeciles while the evidence goes in and then like jurisprudential sponges who can soak
up years of law from a single droning lecture at the end of trial.
When that moment of truth arrives, the jurors "are instructed in the
law . . . in language they are not likely to understand because it
is usually copied from appellate court opinions and directed not so
much at the jurors as at the judges who may later review the case on
appeal." 39
Oddly enough, jurors themselves often let us know that there
are particular instructions that give them more trouble than othersthose about which they send back messages asking the judge for
further clarification-but we usually pay no attention. Has anyone in
this state kept track of the requests for re-instruction by Michigan
juries as clues for determining which are the most incomprehensible
charges the judge delivers? To do so would be a useful task for the
law review editors or free-lance researchers.
Of course, even better than getting rid of the static in communications to the jury would be getting rid of the jury itself in most
39. D. KARLEN,

JUDICIAL .ADMINISTRATION: THE AMERICAN ExPERIENCE

35 (1970).
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civil cases, as the English have done. The jury system may" be, as Sir
John Barry remarked, "a good nursery for the bar,"io but one would
think that in these times there are more productive educational toys
for young advocates to play with.
V.

CONCLUSION

The pluralistic American system of civil justice remains the
wonder of the world of judicial administration. It is riddled with
archaic rigidities and indefensible paradoxes. It is often sluggish and
irrational. As an instrument for resolving disputes, its greatest redeeming feature is that it stands alongside our system of criminal
justice, where its warts seem beauty marks by contrast. It will improve; it must.
Removing from courts matters that can be disposed of in other
ways, devising productive motivations and incentives, and implementing improved communications are approaches that may help
improve the quality of justice. In addition, we need improvement in
three vital areas: men, machinery, and management.
Men-the judges, their aides, and other human resources-are
at the top of the list of needed improvements. The judges must be
properly selected, qualified, and trained. They must be upright-·
they must deserve to be called "Honorable." In populous states and
crowded cities it is impossible for the chief judges to administrate
by day and adjudicate by night, or vice versa. There should be a
division of labor to permit a judge for a period of time to serve exclusively as an administrator; later he would return to adjudicating.
Machinery-the physical resources of courts-must be provided
in civilized abundance. My guess is that we spend less on our courts
than on peanut butter. The balance should be struck so that we have
not only the bricks and mortar, but also the equipment-welldesigned courtrooms and space-work layouts-and the essential instruments for storing and retrieving information about workload and
performance.
Management-by professionally trained career personnel-is not
a fancy frill, but a necessity. A recent survey of five federal district
courts, which was commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center,
reported that even after exemplary new methods are developed in
judicial administration in federal courts, "there is not an effective
... management system for implementing [the] known good prac40. Barry, Compensation Without Litigation, 37 Ausn.. L.J. 339, 343 (1964).
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tices."41 This gap is presently being filled. The means of updating
court methods, techniques, and administration are being studied and
taught by a group of profession-minded organizations that includes,
in addition to the Federal Judicial Center, the American Judicature
Society, the National College of State Trial Judges, the Institute of
Judicial Administration, and the new Institute for Court Management.
The courts must not be required to do more than courts can do,
quantitatively or qualitatively. Avoiding overuse requires determining what types of controversies shall be retained in the court
system, and then devising for them sensible, efficient, fair rules of
procedure that can be studied and tested in action. Not all cases
deserve the same type of court attention and not all procedures
should apply across the board to all types of cases.
With the proper mix of cases, men, mechanisms, modernization
capacity, and management, we can turn more intelligently to the
Task Force's proposed major effort. We can improve the quality of
justice for individuals by establishing a system that will be more
humane, compassionate, and civilized than today's because it will
be fitted with the men and means to function as it should-and not
be abused by profligate overuse.
41. NORTH AM. ROCKWELL INFORMATION SYSTEMS Co., SUMMARY OF A MANAGEMENT
AND SYSTEMS SURVEY OF THE U.S. COURTS 3 (1969).

